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Journal No 22 (2011) pp 80–81☆1. The reviewer's deﬁnition of business cycles is correct in terms of actual vs. potential GDP during
booms and recessions. Figure 2.2 indicates exactly these swings for different eras of Saudi GDP, and not
income ﬂows. The different underlying reasons for this volatility are explained. Figure 2.3 demonstrates
the clear inter-relationships of all three factors affecting Saudi Arabian economy (govt. expenditure, oil
revenues, and ﬂows into savings/investments), as well as the important element of foreign owned factor
resources (remittances) affecting the Saudi economy. The table that follows illustrates the actual
magnitude of such remittance ﬂows, which is also another unique feature of the Saudi economy, in
comparison to Saudi population, GDP and other countries with large foreign labor force.
2. SAMA's stated goals are explicitly set out by the institution and captured in Figure 4.4. SAMA's goals
are not reducing unemployment and GDP management, but these are the goals of the Ministry of Finance
as any observer of the Saudi economy should know. Fiscal policy, and inﬂuencing GDP/unemployment are
the stated goals of the Ministry of Finance and stated in the book. Concerning “domestic money creation
process” Figure 4.8 explains this process, as the Saudi Riyal is a ﬁat currency that is created only by virtue of
dollar/foreign reserve creation, and not through SAMA printing SR notes or the creation of money supply
without backing of foreign reserves. It is the Saudi budgetarymechanism (injections) into the system, and the
resultant SR equivalent of dollar assets that are created, that is the prime operating mechanism for money
creation. Conversely, Saudi Riyals are extinguished out of the system when SR are converted into dollars and
transmitted outside theKingdom. The Saudi economy is not a closed one (p.82). Bank's deposits are generated
primarily from government expenditures which ﬂow into the accounts of the private sector. Table 4.5 (p.95)
expressly highlights the overwhelming importance of the net domestic ﬂows through government spending,
as opposed to commercial bank's claims on the private sector in the analysis of factors affecting the changes in
broad Money Supply M3 in Saudi Arabia. SAMA has gradually evolved certain primary responsibilities for
itself, as well as asserting its independence in the use of certain monetary tools, and shared others with the
Ministry of Finance (pp.78–79, 83). SAMA has indeed been operating on money-supply rule (changes in
required reserves, deposit to loan ratios, setting repo and reverse-repo rates), as opposed to an interest-rate
rule due to itsﬁxed exchange rate policy. There are different strands of opinion on the effectiveness of ﬁxed as
opposed to ﬂoating exchange rates, and these are explored in the book (Table 4.2, p. 89). SAMA's ofﬁcial
stated policy has been to remain ﬁxed to the US dollar (p. 89) and it has intervened through swap facilities
where necessary when speculative pressure on the SR has emerged. The reviewer alludes to Saudi twin deﬁcits.☆ Mohamed A. Ramadv (2010). The Saudi Arabian Economy: Policies, Achievements, and Challenges. Second Edition. Springer,
Pp. xxii — 512. ISBN 978-1-1419-5986-7.
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had a current account deﬁcit since 1999 and this is illustrated in the book (Figure 3.1, page 46). As such, the
issue of twin deﬁcit, on a recurrent basis, as is the case for theUSA, is not a characteristic of the Saudi economy.
4. Capital Markets. The Saudi stock market and its supervision, as well as any shared responsibilities with
other regulators, are important issues. The change in the regulatory aspects of the Saudi stock market have
been extensively highlighted, especially the application of rules, disclosures and listings (pp. 150–152, 154).
The observed deﬁciencies and inherent regulatory biases of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) are also
explored, but not mentioned by the Reviewer. (pp. 155, 157–158).
3. Stockmarket volatility and performance. The performance of the Saudi Stockmarket and the overheating
of the market are mentioned in detail (p. 166, 167, 168). The chapter explores the performance of individual
investors vs. institutional/corporate players, as well as the high P/E ratios and asset bubble issue reached in
February 2006 prior to the crash (p.163). The Chapter explains the different theoretical concepts of investor
behavior (irrational exuberance and herd mentality) and highlights whether the Saudi market exhibits
weak-form efﬁciency, semi-strong efﬁciency or strong form efﬁciency as per economic theory (pp. 165–168). The
different ways that Saudi investors behaved are explored in detail to explain the erratic nature of the Saudi
stock market (pp. 166, 167).
4. Role of Islamic banks. There are no Islamic banks operating under their “Islamic name” in Saudi Arabia, as
SAMA adopts a ﬁt and proper bank supervisory policy and this is highlighted in the SAMA chapter. This in
contrast with neighboring Gulf countries, that allow the establishment of Islamic banks. The Author has
highlighted the growing importance of Islamic ﬁnance in Saudi Arabia, aswell as the tendency for some of the
licensed banks to convert some of their retail branches into Islamic branches as well as the launch of Shariah
compliant mutual funds and issuance of Islamic bonds or Sukuks for mega project ﬁnancing, such as Saudi
Aramco and Sabic's Sukuk issuances.
5. Zakat. The Saudi government does not incorporate zakat collection in its budgetary forecasts for
revenue and expenditures, but that zakat revenues are transferred directly to the Ministry of Social Affairs
for charitable payments. The issue of a more efﬁcient zakat collection system is highlighted in the Chapter
(Table 3.8, p. 68), as an item of the Author's recommended proposals to enhance the revenue system for
Saudi Arabia. There are different Islamic schools of thought (Hanbali, Shaﬁ) which hold differing views on
the concept of zakat i.e. whether Islamic obligations precede application, or whether application precedes
Islamic obligations.
6. The debate on land speculation, real estate housing shortage and the impact of Saudi inﬂation are topics
that can be expanded upon in later editions, although the issue of real estate's contribution to Saudi inﬂation
has been highlighted in the book, as well as the social impact of inﬂation (Figure 4.10, pp. 100–101).
7. Hajj and Umrah. Until the late 1960s, Hajj revenues were an important element of the Saudi State's
revenue, but since the 1970s the revenue derived from Hajj has been an insigniﬁcant source compared to
hydrocarbon and other revenues. This is highlighted in the Public Finance Chapter. The Hajj/Umrah beneﬁts
are mostly localized in the Western Region and a few cities where religion visitors are allowed to travel.
The Saudi government's expenditures on Hajj facilities far outweigh the beneﬁts directly accruing to the
government, as opposed to the Saudi retail/private sector.
8. Cost of unemployment. Concerning the natural rate of unemployment estimation, the Author has used
average size of families' data from the Ministry of Social Affairs as well as population family size censuses to
arrive at the rate of natural unemployment, especially for extended family support for those out of work. In
KSA, families tend to be larger and extended families also provide support, as a formal “signing up” system for
unemployment beneﬁts was not operating as a government policy at the time of publication. As such, Saudi
national rate of unemployment tends to be higher compared with countries that have a formal system of
unemployment beneﬁt registration. The book highlights the Saudi phenomenon of voluntary “educated
unemployed” dealt (pp.382–383), as being unique to resource rich countries such as Saudi Arabia, where
educated youth remain voluntarily unemployed upon returning back from international scholarships in the
hope of obtaining higher paid Government or resource based jobs, and preferring not to take up available, but
less “socially desired” jobs, thus leading to further “natural rate of unemployment” discussed earlier. This is
unlike countries such as Lebanon, Jordan etc. where youth try to obtain higher education to obtain better jobs
abroad, leading to a brain drain and a further cycle of more youth emulating their predecessor's success.
According to a classical view of the market, buyers and sellers ﬁnd one another immediately, without cost,
and have perfect information about the prices of all goods and services. But this is not what happens in the
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that in societies where unemployment beneﬁts are paid, the State can use reductions in such beneﬁts to force
those unemployed back into available jobs. In Saudi Arabia, with no such schemes in place (at time of
writing), only moral suasion and the lack of extended family support will drive unemployed educated/non
educated youth back into the labor market to seek lower than hoped for available jobs. Concerning using
“Okun's Law” to derive potential GDP losses due to unemployment, it is agreed that Okun's initial studies
relate to the U.S. economy and is an empirical relationship. The Author's attempt is to try and estimate the
potential GDP losses for the Saudi economy using the same empirical relationship, as well as ofﬁcial
government unemployment data (for males only) as a starting base and extrapolate forward.
9. The methodologies used by the Author in trying to estimate the unemployment level for the period
2003–2013, are the ones used by economic statisticians. Starting off from the ofﬁcial government
unemployment level (for males only) in 2008 at 9.8%, the Author has used a forward looking labor supply
model that takes into account NEW entrants into the labor market at different levels of schooling, after
allowing for dropouts who might enter the labor force prior to graduation at each school level stage. This
is the rate of new labor entrants to existing labor supply, with deductions made for those reaching
retirement age, and for those who died. Given the relatively young age proﬁle of the Saudi population,
the number of new entrants far exceeds those reaching retirement in the period under question. At the
same time, the Author has used the ofﬁcial government forecast for PLANNED new job generation by the
private sector to absorb forecasted new labor supply entrants. The resultant gap between expected new
private sector job creation (the Govt. sector has remained static in terms of incremental new job creation
as discussed in the book), and labor entrants, is the forecasted unemployment rate for males only.
10. WTO accession impact. The Saudi post-WTO accession time frame for complying with its 2005
accession commitments, whereby the full cost and beneﬁts will only become evident after 2010 for the
majority of Saudi goods and services, i.e. after an average of 5 year grace period for most items is a key
factor. Table 10.4 (pp. 303–309) sets out in great detail the potential impact on a wide sector of Saudi industry
and services as to the likelihood of full WTO impact, once accession commitments are fully implemented.
Even after 2010, full accession impact might not be felt due to the global ﬁnancial crisis and the economic
downturn felt in many countries competing with Saudi goods and services. As for the WTO's impact on
Saudi economic growth and unemployment, pp. 316–317 set out the post-WTO accession agreement
governing the issue of “Saudization” and the concept of “national treatment” labor exemptions that the
Kingdom obtained in this regard.
11. GCC Monetary Union: The implications for a GCC monetary union, following the Euro and global
ﬁnancial crisis are spelled out as well as the lessons learned from the EU experience, especially in avoiding
speculative attacks against a new bloc currency(p.464, 466, 470). EU convergence criteria and GCC
compliance are explored in Table 14.13 (p. 467), along with recommendations for a GCC wide effort to
enhance such convergence and set out on p. 458. The issue of Dubai and the fallout from its crisis on the
GCC is examined in several areas: (p. 433, impact; p. 445 international contagion). As the Author argues,
the prospect for monetary union, as opposed to currency union, is more promising for the GCC given the
global fallout from the recent ﬁnancial crisis, the withdrawal of Oman and UAE from the common
currency, and the weakened Euro and lack of consensus on whether to tie the uniﬁed currency either to
the dollar or to a basket of currencies (pp. 458–459, pp. 467–470).
